On March 26, 2024, the container ship m.v. DALI lost power and struck the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, Maryland, resulting in the catastrophic collapse of the bridge, deaths of six construction workers and destruction of a section of Interstate 695.  The Port of Baltimore was paralyzed for months after the incident.  The collapse disrupted vital transportation routes and led to extensive salvage and cleanup operations, including the removal of 50,000 tons of debris. The original bridge took five years to build, so the rebuilding process “will not be quick, or easy, or cheap” according to the U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg.

Several claims have been filed against the owners and managers of the cargo ship in the aftermath of the incident, including (among others), on September 18, 2024, a $100 million claim by the U.S. Department of Justice, which alleged that the collapse was caused by the “outrageous, grossly negligent, willful, wanton, and reckless” conduct of the owners and operators, who they allege sent out an unseaworthy and poorly maintained vessel with a history of equipment failures to navigate a critical waterway.  The government opposes the petition that was filed by the owners and managers of the vessel to limit their liability to approximately $44 million under the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act—a U.S. statute dating back to 1851 that allows ship owners to limit their total liability to the value of the vessel and pending freight after major incidents (while the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims does not apply in the United States). The lawsuit raises a number of legal and factual issues, including as to the owners’ and managers’ knowledge of the condition of the vessel, and the circumstances and causes of the incident.

At the Port of Baltimore, ships are typically required to have a harbor pilot on board when navigating through the harbor and approaching or leaving the port.  This is a common rule in many U.S. ports to ensure safe passage through waterways, such as crowded harbors or narrow canals.  It requires tugs to assist ships in and out the port but does not mandatorily require extended escorts into the port’s channel or further into the bay.  Tug escorts are only required in Baltimore for specific cargo types like oil or liquid natural gas, and for docking and undocking operations of larger ships with limited maneuverability.  Harbor pilots or the ship’s operator can request extra tug services if and when they have safety concerns. Two harbor pilots were temporarily in charge of navigating the DALI on her exit from the Port of Baltimore.  Two tugboats also initially guided the ship out of the dock and then left the ship when she was safely inside the channel 20 minutes before the collapse.  Minutes before hitting one of the bridge supports, the pilot called for tug assist, but it was too late.

The incident raises questions about safety measures for large ships passing under bridges, including whether additional tugboat escorts could prevent such accidents.  Some have advocated for new regulations requiring tug escorts, changing protocols for tug escorts or standardizing escort rules across ports.  The rules currently vary depending on the port and state, and there are currently no harmonized tug escort requirements at the U.S. federal level, except in certain safety zones and for certain tankers.  This could change.  Note that there are no confirmed new regulations requiring towboat escorts for ships leaving the Port of Baltimore as a result of the collapse.

Implementing such new regulations could introduce complications, such as delays and additional costs.  Further insights may emerge from ongoing investigations, including a report from the National Transportation Safety Board, which could address the feasibility and potential benefits of towboat escorts in preventing similar incidents.